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Jones: Constructive Dividends Resulting from Transactions Between Common

CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS RESULTING FROM
TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN COMMONLY
HELD CORPORATIONS
I. BASIC CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDEND TRANSACTIONS
A determination of when constructive dividends will result from transactions between commonly held corporations
is rather difficult due to the present confusion in this area.
Since the economic and financial impact of a finding of such
distributions can greatly affect the common shareholder and
corporate entities, this area warrants careful attention. The
purpose of this work is to review the basis on which such
constructive dividends are established and to review the development of precedent in order to extract meaningful principles
and guidelines.
The Internal Revenue Code of 19541 provides in the general definition of gross income that gross income means all2
income from whatever source derived including dividends.
Section 316 of the Code defines the term "dividend" as meaning "any distribution of property made by a corporation to its
shareholders- (1) out of its earnings and profits accumulated
after February 28, 1913, or (2) out of the earnings and
profits of the taxable year .

.

."3

This section also provides

that any distribution under this section shall be made from
the most recently accumulated earnings and profits. Section
301 of the Code provides that a distribution of property that
constitutes a dividend is includable in the gross income of a
shareholder, 4 and section 317(a) provides "the term 'property' means money, securities, and any other property .... ,
The formalities of a dividend declaration need not be
observed for the distribution to be taxable as a dividend. 6
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Commissioner
7
v. Makransky :

1. Hereinafter referred to as "the Code".
2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §61.
3. INT. Rlv. CODE of 1954, §316.
4. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §301(c) (1).

5. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §317(a).
6. Barbourville Brick Co., 37 T.C. 7 (1961); L. L. Silverstein, 36 T.C.
438 (1961) ; Louis H. Zipp, 28 T.C. 314 (1957).
7. 321 F2d 598 (3rd Cir. 1963).
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•.. The Internal Revenue Code defines "dividend" in language requiring the satisfaction of four criteria: There must be (1) a "distribution"
of property (2) "made by a corporation" (3) "to its shareholders" (4)
"out of its earnings and profits". Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §316(a);
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, section 115(a), ch. 2, 53 Stat. 46 as amended.
It should be observed that these criteria do not include a requirement
that the distribution be made pursuant to a formal declaration of the
dividend. Informal withdrawals and distributions, although characterized by the parties as other than8 dividends, must be taxed as dividends
if the statutory criteria are met.

Distribution does not need to be proportioned according to
stockholdings, and all stockholders do not have to participate
in the distribution for there to have been a taxable distribution. 9 The distribution, however, must provide the stockholder
with some direct economic benefit.' 0 This benefit does not
have to be of a financial nature but can be merely personal
or paternalistic gratification, fulfillment of a moral obligation, a gift, or other non-financial benefits." In addition, the
benefit received by the stockholder does not have to be considered a dividend by the stockholder or the corporation for it
to be taxed as such. 12 The reasoning underlying the taxation
of a shareholder where a distribution from the corporation is
made to a third person for the benefit of the shareholder is
that this is essentially a distribution to the shareholder himself. Where the shareholder is the sole or controlling stockholder, the reasoning is given that power to dispose of income
is equivalent to ownership of it.'3 This assignment of income
principle was announced in Helvering v. Horst14 and has been
applied to transactions between commonly held corporations
to construct a dividend to the common shareholder on the
8. Id. at 601. (Citations omitted).
9. Hash v. Comm'r, 273 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1959), affg 18 T.C.M. 434
(1959) ; L. L. Silverstein, 36 T.C. 438 (1961).
10. E.g., I. Sachs, 277 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
833 (1960).
11. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Byers v. Comm'r. 199 F.2d
273 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 907 (1953) ; Montgomery Eng'r Co.
v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 838 (D.N.J. 1964) affd 344 F.2d 966 (3rd Cir.
1965).
12. Clark v. Comm'r, 266 F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1959); K. R. Lane, 28 T.C.M.
890 (1969).
13. Byers v. Comm'r, 199 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
907 (1953).
14. 311 U.S. 112 (1940) affg 39 B.T.A. 157 (1939).
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rationale that a distribution was made by one corporation to
another for the benefit of the common shareholder.";
These general observations concerning the judicial
authority in the area of constructive dividends are
helpful in defining the nature of such dividends to which the
Internal Revenue Code fails to refer. Various situations can
arise where a payment, although not formally made with
respect to stock, is classified as a dividend for tax purposes.
Such payments include payment for property transferred,
loans to the shareholder, additional compensation for rendered
services, interest payments on loans, and others. Closely
related are situations where the stockholder receives a benefit
instead of actual payment from the corporation. 16 Although
these situations involving a payment or benefit from the corporation to the shareholder are distinguishable from the more
complex transactions of commonly held corporations, there are
general principles that are applicable to both, especially where
the Horst rationale is applied for the basis of a dividend resulting to the common shareholder from intercorporate transactions. Before reviewing the situations where dividends have
been found to result from transactions between commonly
held corporations or that result from actual distribution
subsequent to manipulations of more than one corporate
entity, it is instructive to note situations where constructive
dividends have arisen, the shareholder himself having received
money, property or benefit from a closely held corporation.
One area where the courts have found constructive distributions by a corporation to its shareholder is where the pay15. George W. Knipe, 24 T.C.M. 668 (1965), aff'd per curtain sub no n.
Equitable Pub. Co. v. Comm'r, 356 F.2d 514 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385

U.S. 822 (1966).
16. One writer has distinguished between cases where amounts are paid
by a corporation to a shareholder for an alleged proper business purpose
(Characterization Distribution) and cases where the shareholder is charged

with a constructive distribution on the basis he received an unwarranted benefit

by virtue of the corporation's payment to a third person or some other arrange-

ment even though the stockholders never receive the wherewithal to pay the
tax (Benefit Distribution). He finds cases of the latter type somewhat odious
and on the outermost fringes of the taxable income pattern since the Commissioner assesses monetary income tax against a nonmonetary benefit received
by a taxpayer. See Teschner, "Hidden Dizidends"-The Paper Tiger of
Constructive CorporationDistributions,43 Taxes 644 (1965). The constructive
dividend theory, as it applies to intercorporate transactions between commonly

held corporations, would be classified as Benefit Distribution since the controlling stockholder has benefited from a particular transaction.
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ments are made indirectly to a shareholder for his benefit.
These payments are usually characterized as personal expenses. The Supreme Court of the United States has said in
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner1 7 that there is income
realized by an employee when his legal obligation is discharged
by his employer. This principal is the basis for the finding of
a constructive dividend in this area1 8 and, in finding this
basis, the courts look to see whether the particular corporate
expenditure primarily benefits the corporation's trade or
business or is primarily for the stockholder's personal benefit.
Of course the finding that such expenditures have been made
primarily for the benefit of a stockholder will not only result
in a constructive dividend to the stockholder but will also result in a denial of a corporate deduction under section 162 (a)
of the Code. Where there is only an indirect benefit to the
stockholder, the courts have found that there will be no distribution to the shareholder.19 Few situations, however, provide
a benefit that is clearly direct or indirect to the stockholder;
consequently, the facts and surrounding circumstances must
be considered in this determination.
Other situations where the
with a constructive distribution
such benefit as to be tantamount
corporate assets by shareholders.
to the stockholder has been found

taxpayer has been charged
by virtue of his receipt of
to a dividend include use of
A constructive distribution
where he has used corporate

17. 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
18. Where the corporation paid part of a joint judgment against the
corporation, the shareholder, and others, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the shareholder's escape from a contested money claim was not
equivalent to receiving income from the corporation and not taxable as a
dividend. Ruben v. Comm'r, 97 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1938). Thus, it appears the
shareholder's obligation must be firmly established for the corporation's satisfaction of it to result in a taxable distribution.
19. There is no direct benefit where the newly formed corporation assumes
liability on partnership notes. Wolf v. Comm'r, 357 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1966) ;
Jewell v. U.S., 330 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1964). Rev. Rul. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 42.
This Revenue Ruling provides that a corporation's redemption of its stock from
a retiring shareholder results in a constructive dividend to remaining shareholders only where the redemption is in the satisfaction of the remaining shareholder's primary and unconditional obligation to purchase such stock. Where
there is no such primary and unconditional obligation, the benefit to the re-

maining shareholders is merely indirect. B. BirrxER

&

INcoME TAXATION OF CORPORATTONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
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property such as yachts and automobiles for personal purposes.

20

Another fertile ground for the finding of constructive
dividends is where corporate funds are transferred to the
stockholder under the pretense of "loans" with no intent to
create a bona fide creditor-debtor relationship. Whether a
loan is recognized as a dividend for tax purposes depends on
the intent of the parties at the time of the withdrawal as
2
extracted from an examination of the actual circumstances. '
Various factors lend to the finding of a constructive dividend
rather than of bona fide debt. Where there are no notes
issued, no interest provided for, no maturity date fixed, no
security given, or the absence of other facts indicative of a
bona fide loan, the court will find a constructive distribution. 2 2 Advances made on open accounts simplify this type of
arrangement and are especially vulnerable to a finding of a
23
constructive dividend.
Another factor in the stockholder's disfavor arises where
2 4
has had a poor dividend record in the past.
corporation
the
Where the withdrawals were for the shareholder's personal
expense2 5 and were not to meet a particular emergency,2 6 the
courts have found a constructive distribution. Where the
corporation makes no attempt to enforce the collection of the
"loan"' 27 and there is no plan or means to repay the advances, 28
a constructive dividend may result to the shareholder. Of
course, a history of advances made to a stockholder with little
or no repayment will bear positively in a finding of a constructive dividend.2 9 It should also be noted that loans that are
bona fide when made to the shareholder can result in a
20. Comm'r v. Riss, Sr., 375 F2d 161 (8th Cir. 1967); American Properties, Inc., 262 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1958), aff'g per curiam, 28 T.C. 1100 (1957).
21. Straub Distrib. Co., 30 T.C.M. 207 (1971); Hoffman, Recognizing
and Avoiding Constructive Dividend Situations, TAx

ADVISOR

411, 413 (July,

1971).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Berthold v. Comm'r, 404 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1968).
Comm'r. v. Maklansky, 321 F.2d 598 (3rd Cir. 1963).
Spheeris v. Comm'r, 248 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1961).
Taschler v. United States, 440 F.2d 72 (3rd Cir. 1971).
Roschuni v. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1959).

27. C. Marcello, 28 T.C.M. 1011 (1969).
28. Tollefsen v. Comm'r, 70-2 USTC 19469 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 908 (1970).
29. Roschuni v. Comm'r, 271 F2d 267 (5th Cir. 1959).
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constructive dividend to that shareholder when, in subsequent
30
years, the corporation forgives that debt.
Constructive dividends can also result from bargain purchases or rentals by shareholders of property belonging to the
corporation. The difference between the price the stockholder
pays for corporate property and its fair market price will be
the amount of the distribution.3 1 Treasury Regulation section
1.301-1(j) states in pertinent part:
If property is transferred by a corporation to a shareholder which is

not a corporation for an amount less than its fair market value in a
sale or exchange, such shareholder shall be treated as having a distri,bution to which Section 301 applies. In such case, the amount of the
distribution shall be the difference between the amount paid for the
property and its fair market value. 32

Under the same principle a bargain lease, as well as a bargain
sale, can result in a constructive dividend to the stockholder.
In this situation the dividend consists of the difference between the property's fair rental value and the amount actually
paid by the shareholder. 33
The constructive dividend can also arise where the corporation makes excessive payments to the shareholder in
leasing or purchasing property. The key test in this area,
as in the bargain purchase or rental area, is whether the
corporation and the shareholders arrived at arm's length
30. Shephard v. Comm'r, 340 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1965).
31. Goodling v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Miss. 1966), afj'd
393 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Maher v. Comm'r, 69-1 USTC 19194 (W.D. Mo.
W.D. 1969). This rationale has also been applied to tax shareholders on a
distribution where the corporation makes a bargain sale to trusts set up by the
shareholders for their children, Harry L. Epstein, 53 T.C. 495 (1969), and even
where a stockholder causes his controlled corporation to make a bargain sale
to another corporation whose sole shareholder is a trust established to provide
income for the shareholder's family. J. G. Spitz, 1971 P-H T.C. Memo 71-54.
The transaction is treated in substance as a distribution by the corporation to
individuals of the difference between the sales price and the fair market value
of the property since the taxpayers enjoy and use this excess as if it had
actually been distributed.
32. Treas. Reg. §1-301-1(1), T.D. 6752, 1964-2 C.B. 84.
33. Rev. Rul. 58-1, 1958-1 C.B. 173; 58th St. Plaza Theatre, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 195 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 820 (1952);
International Artists, Ltd., 55 T.C. 94 (1970). Due to difficulty in ascertaining
the fair rental value of the property, however, the courts have treated the
excess of the corporation's depreciation charges and maintenance expenses over
the rent paid by the shareholder as the distribution. See Lash v. Comm'r, 245
F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1957); Challenge Mfg. Co., 37 T.C. 650 (1962).
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terms in their transaction. If such a finding is not made, the
facts in a particular transaction may indicate that it is
simply nothing more than payment of an informal constructive dividend.3 4 Akin to this area is a situation where property
is distributed to shareholders in kind by the corporation, and
the shareholder leases such property back to the corporation,
the objective being to deduct rental expense under section 162
(a) of the Code. The courts have found that these rental payments are in essence dividends to the shareholders, but where
the transaction conforms with the reality of a reasonable business transaction, no such dividend will be constructed.3 5
The constructive dividend can also be found when there
are excessive salaries paid to the shareholders or their donees
by the corporation. A corporation is entitled under section
162 (a) to conduct a "reasonable allowance for salaries or
other compensation for personal services actually rendered."3 16
Of course, if no services at all are rendered the entire amount
paid out as salary would be considered a constructive dividend.
More frequently, however, there is an excessive payment for
such services rendered, and the excess of this compensation
over the "reasonable" amount is considered a constructive
distribution under section 301 of the Code.
The constructive dividend approach has also been utilized
where the shareholder, through use of fraudulent means, has
intercepted a misguided payment, properly intended for the
corporate treasury, before the corporation received it.
The Government has preferred an assessment under section
61 rather than a dividend approach under section 301 as income received under section 61 is not limited by the amount
of earnings and profits of the related corporation. 7
Where the court finds that a shareholder has made an
investment in the equity of the corporation under the guise
of characterizing such an investment as a "loan", the payment
34. Goldstein v. Comm'r., 298 F2d 562 (9th Cir. 1962); Crabtree v.
Comm'r, 221 F2d 807 (2d Cir. 1955) ; A. A. Emerson, 44 T.C. 86 (1955).
35. Armston Co. v. Comm'r, 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951); Ingle Coal
Corp. v. Comn'r, 174 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1949).
36. INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, §162(a).
37. This preference was especially exercised after James v. United States,
366 U.S. 313 (1961), which held embezzled funds could be taxed to the embezzler. The constructive dividend approach, however, still has widespread use.
B. BrrTEE & J. EUsTCE, FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATioN OF CORPORATIONS AND)
SHAREHOLDERS f[
7.05 at 7-34 (3rd ed. 1971).
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of interest or principal will be considered as a distribution to
him. 38 This type of distribution is comparable to a dividend
or redemption of stock.
In most of these transactions between the corporation
and its shareholders, tax avoidance motives are usually present. In fact, tax avoidance in some situations has risen to the
level of civil or criminal fraud.3 9 But tax avoidance motives
are not necessary to a finding that there has been a constructive distribution to the shareholder. It is, however, important
to note that where the court finds clear tax avoidance manipulations, the taxpayer will be charged the distribution regardless of the particularities of the transaction under review.
II.

MULTI-CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS

Where two or more corporations are commonly held,
constructive distributions may be found as a result of certain
manipulations or transactions. Of interest is the historical
development and application of the constructive dividend theory in this area.
Helvering v. Gordon40 provides the starting point for an
overview of the application of the constructive dividend concept in a multi-corporate context. In the Gordon case, the
taxpayer and his wife were in sole control of B can corporation, an operation extremely profitable in light of the taxpayer's friendship with the supplier of tin used in the can
company's manufacturing process. The taxpayer received
discounts from the supplier but, because he feared that customers of the can company would be unwilling to pay regular
prices if they knew of the discounts, had the discounts paid
over to A realty company in the form of commissions. The
Revenue Act of 1924 had made income tax forms open to the
public. The taxpayer and his wife also owned all the stock
of A realty company, but in different proportions, the taxpayer's interest being considerably less than his interest in the
can company (5%o as compared to 80%o). The constructive
dividend issue arose when the A realty company paid out this
commission income as dividends in accordance with the stock
38. Id. at 7-27.
39.
(D.N.J.
Lasker,
40.

Montgomery Engineering Co. v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 838
1964), aff'd per curiam, 344 F.2d 996 (3rd Cir. 1965); Minnie F.
11 T.C.M. 50 (1952).
87 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1937).
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ownership of A realty company. The Commissioner contended the distribution should be taxed as if it were a distribution of B can company, according to that company's stock
ownership. The Tax Court rejected this contention, 41 but the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The evidence
showed the A realty company was formed solely for receiving
the rebates from the tin supplier, and the circuit court stated:
The arrangement so devised and executed was a mere device for
siphoning the earnings of the can company out of its treasury and into
the realty company, which served merely as a container to hold such
earnings until Gordon and his wife should determine to distribute
them. 4 2

So regardless of the taxpayer's contention that the corporate
arrangement was necessitated by business reasons in that the
large profit margin of B can company had to be concealed

in order to keep its customers, 43 the distribution was treated
as though it were made by the can company. The court noted

the suggested business motive prior to the repeal of the revenue provision in 1926. The court did not judge the legitimacy
of the motive but simply stated: "As we view the case, however, motive is immaterial. The decision must turn upon the
effect of what was done." 44 Tax avoidance weighed heavily
in the court's decision.
The Gordon case has been cited numerous times for the
general proposition that the substance, not the form of a
41. 29 B.T.A. 275 (1933). In a companion case, Gordon Can Co. v.
Conner, 29 B.T.A. 272 (1933), the Tax Court employed section 45 of the
Revenue Act of 1928, a predecessor of section 482 of the 1954 Code, to allocate
the income to B can company from the A realty company that had received
the income in the form of commissions. It is significant to note that the Tax
Court found no dividend consequence from the mere allocation of this income
under section 45. This result is cited as an example of the so called "nullity
theory" where the effect of this type of reallocation is ignored. That is, there is
no dividend consequence resulting from an allocation of B's income to A where
the funds are still physically held by B. This is to be compared with dividend
consequences resulting from similar transactions discussed subsequently in this
note. See Jenks, Constructive Dividends Resulting From Section 482 Adjust.
eients, 24 TAx LAwYER 83, 93 (1970).
42. 87 F.2d at 666.
43. A provision of the Revenue Act of 1924 (43 Stat. 293, § 257) provided
for the making of income tax returns open to the public. The court, however,
noted that the Gordon arrangement continued after the repeal of this provision
in 1926.
44. 87 F2d at 666.
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particular transaction, will be determinative for tax purposes.45 As there was reallocation by the Commissioner only to
the extent of actual distribution, more specifically the case has
been referred to as standing for the general proposition that
there is no constructive dividend to the shareholder as long as
the property transferred to the sister corporation remains in
corporate solution and out of the hands of the shareholder. 46
This interpretation results from a rather restrictive reading
of the case, in light of later developments in this area. Factually, of course, there was an actual distribution in the case.
The opinion, however, does not indicate whether the court
would have found a constructive distribution as a result of the
receipt by one corporation of income that properly belonged
to another corporation but short of any actual distribution of
the income to the shareholders. In any event, the dividends
constructed in Gordon were solidly based on an actual distribution, as opposed to a transaction where the funds remain in corporate solution.
Of interest are cases involving subsidiaries of controlled
corporations where there has been an actual transfer of funds
out of corporate solution. In those cases advances from subsidiaries of controlled corporations have been held to be constructive distributions from the subsidiaries' parent to the
47
shareholders.
In Ben R. Meyer,48 the Board of Tax Appeals found a
distribution which constituted dividends to the taxpayers from
parent corporation A that owned all the stock of subsidiary
corporation B. The petitioners owned all the stock of A
corporation and withdrew funds from B corporation. These
withdrawals were listed on the corporate books in standing
accounts with the petitioners. The dividend determination was
made even though partial repayment, some of which was
designated as interest, was made to B corporation and even
though the petitioners insisted the advances were loans. The
Board of Tax Appeals reached its decision by first determining that, in substance, the petitioners were stockholders of B
45. E.f., Bradbury v. Comin'r, 298 F.2d 111, 114 (1st Cir. 1962).
46. Welles, Bargain Sales Between Sister Corporations, 55 A.B.A.J. 882,
883 (1969).
47. Tollefsen v. Comm'r, 70-2 USTC 9469 (2d Cir. 1970); Jacob M.
Kaplan, 43 T.C. 580 (1965); cf. Ben R Meyer, 45 B.T.A. 228 (1941).
48. 45 B.T.A. 228 (1941).
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corporation although its stock was held by A corporation.
Secondly, the Board determined that the petitioners' net withdrawals constituted dividends from the earnings and profits
of A corporation as provided by Section 115 (a) of the Revenue
Act of 1984. 49 The Board noted:
Through the holding of such offices, petitioners were in fact and actual
practice in absolute control, petitioners, over a period of years including the taxable years in question, have withdrawn Limited's earnings or profits at their own discretion, for their own personal uses, and
in a manner which best suited their own purposes. 5 0

The Board noted that, subsequent to the formation of B, corporation A had made no formal distribution of dividends, even
though during each of the taxable years A corporation had
accumulated earnings and profits available for distribution.
The contention that the form of the transactions indicated
they were loans was rejected in light of the facts and circumstances of the Board's findings. The Board looked through
the form of the corporate organization and designated the
recipients of the advances as the shareholders of distributing
subsidiary B. Here the distributions were limited to the earnings and profits of the subsidiary.
Another approach to this type of transaction is to consider the subsidiary a mere conduit through which the earnings and profits of the parent are distributed. Using this
approach, the distributions are taxable to the extent of the
parent's earnings and profits, not the subsidiary's. In Kaplan
v. Commissioner,51 the Tax Court found that "non-interestbearing loans of infinite duration" paid to a parent corporation's sole stockholder by the parent's wholly owned subsidiary constituted taxable dividends to the stockholder. The court
noted that such distributions would be taxable to the extent
of the parent's earnings and profits. No corporate business
purpose of either the parent or the subsidiary was shown; in
fact, the subsidiary was not even in a financial position to
make the loan. The intention of the stockholder at the time
49. Section 115. Distribution By Corporations:
(a) Definition of Dividend- The term "dividend" when used
in this title . . . means any distribution made by a corporation

to its shareholders, whether in money or other property, out of
its earnings or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913.

50. 45 B.T.A. at 238.
51. 43 T.C. 580 (1965).
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of the loan was not to repay but to use the sums for his
personal use. The court found that the petitioner dominated
and controlled affairs of both corporations and considered
them instrumentalities through which he handled investments.
The court was convinced that the source of the withdrawals
received by the petitioner was the parent corporation and
stated:
.. . and that petitioner, in the exercise of his unfettered control over
both corporations, caused $968,000 to be paid out to him through
the
52
medium of Jemkap, as a conduit and subservient instrumentality.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied this same
approach to a transaction in which funds had been withdrawn
from a subsidiary by a taxpayer in Tollefsen v. Commissioner.53 The taxpayer and his wife owned all the stock of the
parent corporation, and the subsidiary was wholly owned by
the parent corporation. The circuit court reiterated the importance the Tax Court gave to determining whether there
was an intent to make a loan, that is, contemplation of repayment by the parties. The advances were evidenced by noninterest bearing notes, but the evidence indicated no intention
or plan of repayment. The circuit court accepted the Tax
Court's analysis of the transaction as consisting of two steps,
the first, a transfer from the subsidiary to its parent and
second, a transfer from the parent to the taxpayer. The circuit court viewed the situation as similar to Kaplan in that
there was an indirect distribution by the parent corporation
caused to be paid from the subsidiary.
Wiseman v. United States54 was a suit for income tax
refund. The plaintiff owned two corporations, A and B. A
was a successful operation, but B had been losing money for
several years and the plaintiff wanted to liquidate it. In order
to set B's losses off against A's profits, the plaintiff transferred all of his stock in B corporation to A in exchange for
an indebtedness on A's books. The First Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the United States District Court for the
District of Maine's determination that the creation of the
indebtedness constituted a corporate distribution equivalent
to a dividend and taxable to the plaintiff as ordinary income
to the extent of A's earnings and profits. The court rejected
52. 43 T.C. at 595.
53. 70-2 USTC ff9469 (2d Cir. 1970).
54. 371 F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1967).
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the plaintiff's contention that the transaction was prompted
by a legitimate business purpose, the liquidation of B to enable

A to obtain a tax loss on the liquidation of B:
That the transaction was motivitated by a legitimate business purpose
is not disputed. But where, as here, the taxpayer is the sole or dominant
stockholder of the distributing corporation, motive is irrelevant. For
motive to have any meaningful significance at least the line between
shareholder must be more sharply drawn than it is in this case. Bradbury, supra at 118. The real question here is what was accomplished
by this transaction. The answer is that plaintiff received an unfettered
indebtedness. 55

So in most instances involving the corporation and its
shareholders, the stockholder actually receives property,
money, or something of value that is later determined to be a

dividend.

In most intercorporate transactions involving

commonly held corporations, however, the person charged with

receipt of the dividend will not in fact have received the property or money.

For the sake of logical presentation and analysis, divi56
sion of these cases by specific types of transactions is made.

Important to remember, however, is that basic principles and
considerations run throughout the case law, regardless of the

specific type of transaction from which constructive dividends
are deemed to result. Utilization of related corporations in

multi-corporate transactions does not in itself result in disregard of the corporation as a separate entity and in construc-

tive dividend treatment. The nature of the transaction, as well
as the consideration of other relevant factors such as business
purpose, will enter into the determination of the tax conse-

quences of a particular transaction.
In cases where these intercorporate transactions have

taken place, the funds remain in corporate solution and the
55. Id. at 818. The importance of a valid business purpose in precluding
application of the constructive dividend theory to transactions between commonly held corporations will become apparent with a review of the cases in
the area. It is submitted that the lack of importance attached to it here is
due to the nature of the business purpose. That is, this motive approaches tax
avoidance.
56. Difficulties exist in trying to characterize the various transactions as
their nature is not always clear. Courts frequently find that a transaction is
substantively different from what it appears to be and in other cases, e.g.,
W. B. Rushing, 52 T.C. 888 (1969), af'd 441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971), the
court has not found it necessary to identify the particular transaction once the
issue of constructive distribution has been resolved.
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earnings and profits of either corporation are not available

to the shareholder without a distribution, even though he has
been charged with a constructive dividend. The common
stockholder of the closely held corporation benefits in several
ways from the transfer of property from one of his corporations to another. As one writer notes:
If one corporation is operating at a profit, and the other at a loss,
transferring income from the former to the latter avoids tax at the
corporate level. The loan of funds or other transfer of assets may keep
the losing corporation in business. Or perhaps one of the corporations
has accumulated earnings tax unless it pays dividends. The stockholder
may wish to sell one of the corporations and by transferring funds from
the other, convert ordinary income into capital gain. Thus, non-arm's
length transactions between the related corporations may be motivated
by tax considerations beneficial to the stockholder. Regardless of
motives, there may be an economic benefit in the transfer of funds,
which the stockholder could not have obtained otherwise, except by
means of a dividend and reinvestment. Under what circumstances will
57
he be charged with constructive dividend income?

A.

Services

This category includes transactions which result in a
benefit to one of the corporations. Either there is overpayment for services performed by another related corporation,
an underpayment, or actually no services performed even
though payment is made.
Walter L. Morgan"s was a case in which the Commis-

sioner was unsuccessful in applying the constructive dividend
theory after liquidation of a sister corporation. Corporation
A and corporation B agreed under advisement from the I.R.S.
to an allocation of gross income for tax purposes under section
45 of the 1939 Code. 59 This income had been reported on B's
return but was allocated to A for tax purposes as this was
57. Jenks, Constructive Dividends Resulting From Section 482 Adjustinents, 24 TAx LAwYE_ 83, 87 (1970).
58. 33 T.C. 30 (1959), rev'd on another issue, 288 F.2d 676 (3rd Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 836 (1961), acquiesced in, 1960-1 C.B. 5.
59. Section 45 of the 1939 Code is the predecessor of section 482 of the
1954 Code, discussed subsequently. Here A corporation was the national
sponsor, or underwriter, promoter, and distributor of a related corporation C.
B corporation was the promoter and distributor of C corporation stock in a
region of the country under a contract with A corporation. Because of the
unrealistic reflection of income, deductions, credits, and allowances reported
on B's return, these amounts were allocated to A corporation under section 45
to properly reflect the income of A corporation.
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income received for services actually performed by A. One
year later, it was decided to liquidate corporation B which
still held the income for services performed by A. After this
was done, the petitioners reported the gain on the liquidation
of the assets of corporation B as long term capital gain. The
Commissioner, on the other hand, contended that the liquidation was, in reality, a dividend to the common shareholders
from corporation A as B's assets in reality belonged to A. In
other words, this was merely a liquidation of A's assets that
had remained in B's hands, even though the value had been
allocated for corporate tax purposes under section 45. The
Tax Court refused to treat the liquidation as a constructive
distribution to the taxpayer, noting:
Section 45 authorizes the distribution, apportionment, or allocation of
gross income deductions, credits, or allowances; it does not authorize
the distribution, apportionment, or allocation of net assets, surplus,
or accumulated earnings and profits either specifically or by necessary
implication. 60

This case would seem to be a rejection of the principle in the
Gordon case that there will be a constructive dividend to the
common shareholders where there is distribution of earnings
and assets of one corporation made by the other related corporation. This case questions the validity of the "nullity
theory" that the Gordon case is considered to represent. 61
Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find no dividend consequence in this transaction at all. And if such consequence
does not arise as a result of liquidation, it must have arisen
as a result of the allocation of the income under section 45.
The court's opinion has been criticized on the basis that here
the Commissioner was not trying to allocate assets, or for that
matter, anything else.62 The Commissioner was asserting that
these assets remain the property of A, even though still held
by B. By virtue of the Commissioner's acquiescence in the
case on this issue, one can say with a reasonable degree of
certainty that if a sister corporation accumulates the earnings
and profits of another commonly held corporation and, after
some time, liquidates, the Commissioner will not treat the
liquidation as a constructive dividend from the corporation
originally entitled to the funds. One can assess that the trans60. 33 T.C. at 41.
61. Jenks, mipra note 57 at 93.
62. Id. at 94.
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fer of profits and earnings of one corporation to another
commonly held corporation would result, if at all, in immediate
tax consequences.6 3 Dividend tax consequences would not result from a corporate liquidation where the liquidating corporation held assets properly belonging to a sister corporation.
The most appropriate time for the Commissioner to assert a
constructive dividend distribution in such a situation would
seem to be at the time the assets are diverted to the tranferee
sister corporation.6
A very significant case in this area is George W. Knipe.65
Equitable Publishing Company (hereinafter referred to as
Equitable), a profitable publishing company, and North Penn
Publishing Company (hereinafter referred to as North Penn),
a corporation in poor financial condition that had been operating at a loss since its inception, were owned equally by Knipe
and Berky. These two stockholders, who initially owned
Equitable, purchased North Penn to keep the corporation from
operating in competition with Equitable. Equitable made payments to North Penn on the basis that North Penn was
entitled to such revenues in accordance with an advertising
income participation agreement. These amounts were omitted
from Equitable's income tax return for the years in question
per the agreement whereby North Penn was to have promoted
Equitable's advertising and subscriptions and also protected
Equitable from competition by serving as a buffer. The Commissioner contended that these amounts transferred from
Equitable to North Penn represented the former's earnings
and profits and should have been included in gross income of
Equitable. The Tax Court found North Penn made no substantial contribution to the production of any of the income
that was reported by Equitable or of those funds transferred
to North Penn. As the Tax Court stated:
In our opinion, and we have found accordingly, the several advertising
income participation agreements entered into by Equitable and North
63. There should, of course, be no dividend consequence where there is a
statutory or other exception applicable. For example, where there can be
repatriation without tax dividend consequences where the income of a domestic
taxpayer has been increased by application of section 482 of the Code. See Rev.
Proc. 65-17, 1965-1 C.B. 833, as amended by Rev. Proc. 65-17, Amend I, 1966-2
C.B. 1211; Rev. Proc. 65-31, 1965-2 C.B. 1024, 1037.
64. Sparks Nugget, Inc., 29 T.C.M. 318 (1970), appeal pending, 9th Cir.
65. 24 T.C.M. 668 (1965) affd per curiam sub nor. Equitable Publishing
Co. v. Comm'r, 356 F2d 516 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966).
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Penn with respect to such years did not constitute real and genuine
business transactions entered into by Equitable for profit or for any
other proper business purpose but for the mere purpose of distributing
to North Penn earnings and profits of Equitable without a business
basis therefore. 66

The Commissioner also contended that one-half of the amounts
paid by Equitable to North Penn under the participation
agreements constituted constructive dividends to the partowner Knipe. The Tax Court found that there was indeed a
constructive dividend to the taxpayer. The petitioner argued
that the payments were for services to Equitable and that
the payments were not a gift nor did they extinguish any
obligation of the shareholder. He also pointed out that neither
shareholder had any personal obligation to satisfy any of
North Penn's obligations, and neither stockholder derived
any benefit from the transfers in question. 67 The court reiter-

ated its opinion that there had been no substantial contribution
by North Penn to Equitable's production of income and that
there was a lack of any proper corporate purpose in the
advertising income participation agreement. The court utilized the Horst principle 68 in justifying its decision that Knipe
had received a constructive distribution. The Tax Court applied this principle as follows:
As stockholders and officers of Equitable, Knipe and Berky had the
power to cause it to dispose of its income and accumulated earnings
and profits. They exercised that power by causing Equitable to make
a disposition thereof by way of distributions to North Penn in amounts
equal to the amounts of income omitted by Equitable in its income tax
returns for the respective taxable years in issue without any business
66. 24 T.C.M. at 684.
67. The taxpayer's argument here was made up of criteria that have been
determinative in other situations that there was no dividend consequence as a
result of an intercorporate transaction.
68. Power to dispose of income is equivalent to ownership of it, and the
exercising of this power to pay income to another results in enjoyment of
realization of income. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), aff'g 39 B.T.A.

157 (1939).
In the Horst case the taxpayer owned certain bonds and clipped the coupons
from them for his son. He delivered the coupons to his son before maturity as
a gift. Within the taxable year the son received payments on the coupons, and
he reported the amounts in his income tax return for the taxable year. The
taxpayer was the owner of the bonds throughout the taxable year and made
his tax return on the cash receipts and disbursement basis. It was held that
the amounts received by the son on the coupons were taxable to the taxpayer as income.
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purpose of Equitable. Under the Horst case, the foregoing power was
the equivalent of ownership of the income and accumulated earnings and
profits involved. The exercise of that power to procure payment of
income and accumulated earnings and profits in amounts in question
to North Penn was the enjoyment and hence the realization of income
by those who exercised the power, namely, Knipe and Berky. As a
consequence the amounts in question are to be regarded as income
taxable to them as dividends. 69

The court's opinion cited Commissioner v. Makransky7 as
pointing out that the principles in Horst had been applied in
various cases7 1 holding the major stockholder of a corporation
taxable for the distribution of corporate earnings and profits
to a third party for some purpose which he wishes to serve,
even where there is no receipt of financial gain by the stockholder. The Horst principle was applied in the Makransky
case to tax payments made to the grantor of a trust as dividends where such payments were made to him primarily for
the benefit of a trust in satisfying a judgment creditor's claim
against the trust. The corpus of the trust was endangered by
virtue of obligations incurred by the grantor prior to insolvency. The grantor did not gain anything from the loans; only
the trust benefited from the satisfaction of the obligation.
For purposes of analysis, it is important to note that
strong tax avoidance motives would appear to have dominated
the arrangement in Knipe, whereby payments were made to
North Penn who provided no substantial contribution to
Equitable's gross income or the funds that were transferred.
Also significant is the court's determination that there was no
proper corporate business purpose served by this arrangement.
Also pertinent for discussion in a later portion of this note
is that the allocation of the transferred funds from Equitable
to North Penn appears to have been made under the broad
general section 61 of the Code defining gross income, rather
than section 482 of the Code that provides for the allocation
of income between commonly held corporations.
Worehester v. Commissioner72 involved similar facts. In
69. 24 T.C.M. at 695.
70, 321 F.2d 598 (3rd Cir. 1963), affg 36 T.C. 446 (1961).
71. Byers v. Comm'r, 199 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
907 (1953); Whitehead v. Comm'r, 148 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1945); Clark v.
Comm'r, 84 F.2d 725 (3rd Cir. 1936). See also Biltmore Homes, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 288 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1961).
72. 370 F.2d 713 (1st Cir. 1966).
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that case payments were made from the stockholder's A corporation to his other controlled corporation, B, allegedly for
services relating to A corporation's architectural and engineering services and construction work. The First Circuit
Court of Appeals agreed with the Tax Court's determination
that this transfer of funds was income to the common controlling shareholder, Worchester. The Circuit Court noted:
Any other rule would permit a stockholder to convert income into
capital gains by transferring funds from one business to another then
selling the latter company at a profit; or, if that were not permitted,
at least to escape strictures placed on accumulation of income by
sections 531-537 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§531-537,
73
and thereby postpone at will the realization of taxable income.

The court also noted that B corporation operated its restaurant at a substantial loss, thereby avoiding any tax on most
of the funds transferred from corporation A. The Worchester
case also involved payments made to the corporation's stockholders for business expenses that were unsupported, in addition to payments made to third parties for bribery of public
officials. These transactions, as well as the transfer of funds
from A corporation to B corporation for services that were
never performed, appear to have impressed the court as a
scheme of tax avoidance. The opinion indicated that the finding of obvious tax avoidance motivation is sufficient to find
constructive dividends in this type of situation. In fact, both
Knipe and Worchester have been characterized as involving
tax avoidance manipulation that would be sufficient, without
further consideration of the facts, to charge the common
shareholder with a constructive distribution as a result of the
transaction between the commonly held corporations.7 4
Another case which would fall under the category of
transactions involving services is Sterno Sales Corp. v. United
States.7 5 In this case, the taxpaying corporation tried to invoke a constructive dividend theory to its advantage. Corporation A and corporation B were sister corporations and wholly
owned subsidiaries of C parent corporation. The Tax Court
held that payments by B corporation to A corporation for sales
compensation were excessive and could not be deducted under
section 162 (a) of the Code by B corporation. 76 The court
73. Id. at 715.
74. Jenks, supra note 57 at 88.

75. 345 F2d 552 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
76. Sterno, Inc., 18 T.C.M. 1149 (1959), affd 286 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1961).
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further held that the excessive compensation remained taxable
to A Corporation which received it, even though the compensation was non-deductible under section 162 (a) for corporation
B. In a suit for refund of the tax paid by A on the compensation determined excessive, the plaintiff argued that the
excessive compensation was actually a contribution to capital
from the parent corporation C, following a constructive dividend from B corporation to the parent C. The Court of Claims
rejected the plaintiff's argument, commenting on the nature
of the funds in question:
Compensation remains compensation even if it is held unreasonable in
amount, and, accordingly, not deductible as a business expense. The
payment does not change in character solely because it is characterized
as excessive or undue. The non-deductibility of the expense by the
payer, because it is unreasonable in amount, does not transform the
77
payment in the hands of the payee.

The court said the taxpayer could only take advantage of
recharacterization of the nature of a transaction when the
Government changed its mind as to the nature of the transaction. Two judges dissented in the opinion of the court,
viewing the actual effect of the transaction as a payment of a
dividend that resulted from a shifting of the earnings and
profits of B corporation. Considering the court's opinion in
Sterno, it is of interest to consider whether there would have
been a constructive dividend consequence to the parent corporation C if the Commissioner had invoked the theory, after
making a correlative adjustment by excluding the compensation payment deemed excessive from the corporation A's
78
gross income.
In Commissioner v. Offult,7 9 the Commissioner contended that a constructive dividend resulted to the sole stockholder of a development company when he caused the company to transfer water and sewer utilities to another whollyowned corporation formed to provide the service for the
development company's subdivision. The transfer was gratuitous, other than the utility company's obligation to main77. 345 F.2d at 554.
78. If section 482 of the Code is used to allocate gross income between
commonly held controlled corporations, Treas. Reg. §1.482-(d) (2) would
require a correlative adjustment to be made to the corporation from which
income has been allocated.
79. 336 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1964).
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tain and provide water and sewerage service to the subdivision. Noting that such a transfer was common for real estate
developers in that state and that such utilities were necessary
to meet the approval of county and state authorities, the court
held that there was no dividend involved in these transfers
since there was a valid business purpose.
Relying heavily on this decision, the Tax Court held in
Walter K. Dean8 0 that where the sole shareholder of a corporation engaged in the business of developing residential
subdivisions in Florida had transferred utilities to a utility
company indirectly controlled by the taxpayer's son-in-law,
the transfer did not result in a constructive dividend to the
shareholder. The court pointed out the necessity for having
such utilities for F.H.A. and V.A. financing of the subdivision
homes and that an absence of monetary consideration for the
transfer did not necessarily mean an absence of any consideration, as the utility was assuming the maintenance of the system and any possible liability for pollution. The court said
the test was whether the stockholder of a transferor corporation benefited from the transaction and noted a valid business purpose here:
...Warrington had a valid business purpose in making these transfers
and that, other than in a derivative way, Dean did not benefit from
these transfers. W. B. Rushing supra.8 1

B.

Sales

Constructive dividend problems in this area could arise
from unreasonable inter-corporate pricing arrangements,
bargain sales of property between sister corporations, and
property sales by one related corporation to another at a
premium price.8 2 Early cases espoused the principle that
where funds are transferred from one controlled corporation
to another for the benefit of the majority stockholder, taxable
83
dividends will result.
84
the Eighth Circuit Court of
In Byers v. Commissioner,
Appeals affirmed the Tax Court's determination that exces-

80. 57 T.C. No. 5 (Oct. 6, 1971).
81. Id. at 3463.
82. Eustice, Tax Problems Arising From Transactions Between Affiliated
or Controlled Corporations,16TH ANNUAL TrL. TAX INST. 57, 82 (1966).
83. Biltmore Homes, Inc. v. Comm'r, 288 F2d 336 (4th Cir. 1961) ; Byers

v. Comm'r, 199 F2d 273 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 907 (1953).
84. 199 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. den., 345 U.S. 907 (1953).
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sive payments made from a controlled corporation to a partnership set up by the corporation's controlling stockholder
were constructive distributions to the controlling stockholder
in the amount in excess of what a disinterested third party
would have charged the corporation for excess operating
expenses. The controlled corporation was engaged in a trucking operation, and the controlling stockholder conceived the
idea of setting up a partnership for his son and daughter to

provide gasoline for the operation. The corporation paid the
partnership two cents more per gallon than it had previously
paid a distributor, even though it could have continued to
purchase gasoline from the distributor at this lower price.

The partnership initially sold only gasoline to the corporation,
and this remained its principal source of income even though a
service station was opened to the public some years later. In
assessing a constructive dividend to the majority stockholder,
Byers, the court found the arrangement to be an overall
scheme for tax avoidance:
As to the deficiency against Byers, the circumstances also plainly
seem to us to have significant logical probative force to support the
view that the formation of the daughter-and-son parnership and the
buying of gasoline from it at a two cent excess over the corporation's
previous source constituted a plan on Byers' part to divert earnings of
the corporation from himself as major stockholder to his children as
family members; that this siphoning off of corporate earnings, on each
occasion that the excess was paid, amounted in the situation to dividend
distributions at these various times; and that such payments therefore
had the nature and effect of a receiving of dividend income by Byers,
to the extent of his stockholding. 85

The court found it of no moment that Byers might not have
had a current right to the income, as it cited the Horst principle to the effect that the power to have received funds was
sufficient to charge him with a dividend consequence:
• . . Byers' disposition of his power to have received such funds as
dividends subsequently, through the effecting of a present payment of
them to his daughter and son as gasoline priced in the manner done,
would still be capable of maling their receipt by the children constitute
the realization of income by him during the taxable year involved,
as a model of paternal satisfactions in the family relationship .... 86

Another case analagous to those involving actual sales
between related corporations is Biltmore Homes, Inc. v. Com85. Id. at 275.
86. Id. at 276.
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missioner.8 7 In this case, three brothers owned a real estate
corporation, Biltmore Homes, Inc., and also two finance and
mortgage corporations that had been held to be exempt from
federal income taxes during the years in question under section 101 (4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.88 By transferring to one of the mortgage companies a mortgage that
was in excess of what was actually paid out for the construction of a particular project, an excess ended up in the
mortgage and finance companies, and Biltmore deducted
the full price of the mortgage first transferred. Although
the court could not specifically locate the amount which
represented the difference between base value of the mortgages and the amounts actually paid out by the mortgage
and finance companies, it concluded that since the excess was
not paid to Biltmore (as evidenced by the stockholder's receiving no part of this profit when the liquidation of Biltmore
occurred) the amounts must have been diverted into other
channels for the benefit of Biltmore's stockholders. Here
again the court found the transactions to be an overall plan
for tax avoidance:
The only reasonable explanation is that by a complicated course of
transactions they hoped to make it appear that one or the other or both
of the tax exempt corporations received the profit so that it might
escape taxation altogether.8 9

Sammons v. United States9o was a suit for refund of
taxes paid upon a determination that a constructive dividend
occurred to the common stockholder when stock was transferred between corporations. One corporation that was indirectly controlled by Sammons purchased the fixed assets
of a paper bag corporation, while other assets were acquired
by a corporation which had five corporate owners controlled
by Sammons. The fixed assets were then leased to the corporation that acquired the other assets in order to carry on
an operating business. Then the five corporations sold their
stock in the corporation operating the bag business for cost
to another corporation controlled by Sammons. This corporation then sold the stock for over $500,000 profit.
87. 288 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1961).
88. Section 101(4) of the 1939 Code was the predecessor of section 501
of the 1954 Code that provides tax exemption for certain corporations.
89. 288 F2d at 339.

90. 433 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1970).
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In conclusion, we hold Sammons received a constructive dividend
when he moved the paper bag business between wholly-owned or controlled corporate entities at a price which the jury reasonably concluded
to be one-half million dollars below fair market value. In reality then,
the taxpayer took money from his five corporations and placed it in a
sixth. It is of little consequence that he personally received no money
from the transaction, for it is the power to dispose of income and the
exercise of that power that determines whether taxable income has been
received.91

Once again the court employed the Horst principle to charge
the controlling stockholder with a constructive dividend.
Where there has been a less than arm's length sale of
stock or notes from one controlled corporation to another, to
prevent the common controlling stockholder from becoming
personally liable on a corporate loan, the constructive dividend
theory has been applied.
In Charles A. Sammons92 the Commissioner charged a
business tycoon with a constructive distribution as a result
of a transaction that took place within a complex multi-corporate structure. Sammons owned a number of insurance
companies which owned some 60 commercial corporations.
He acquired Aero-Test Equipment Company (hereinafter
referred to as Aero) from bankruptcy in hopes of resurrecting the corporation into a profitable enterprise. Sammons
obtained indirect control of Aero by the utilization of several
of his controlled corporations. The Bankruptcy Court had
required that Aero secure a million dollar line of credit so
that the company might have an adequate amount of operating capital. The First National Bank of Dallas, Texas, was
unwilling to accept the guarantee of the several controlled
corporations for this million dollar line of credit. The bank
required the loans be personally guaranteed by Sammons.
Therefore, he gave them his personal guarantee for all loans
made to Aero up to one million dollars. After the company
began operations under the Sammons organization, it consistently lost money and suffered losses during the entire
time of its operation. The bank, concerned with the million
dollar loan which it had made to Aero, required Sammons to
substitute his personal note for the money, and this note was
renewed twice. Aero, although clearly insolvent, was able to
91. Id. at 732. (Citations omitted)
92. 30 T.C.M. 626 (1971). This case involves the same taxpayer as
Sanmons v. United States, id.
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pay off this million dollar indebtedness as a result of complex
inter-corporate transactions involving the sale of Aero preferred stock for cash. Four controlled holding corporations
indirectly owned by Sammons did not have funds to purchase
the $1,200,000 preferred stock issue of Aero. These corporations issued their own shares of preferred stock in the same
amount and substantially in the same form as the issue of
Aero preferred stock. The issue of preferred stock in the
holding companies that was worthless at the time of issue, or
became worthless shortly thereafter, was purchased by four
insurance companies controlled by Sammons. The four insurance companies had on hand accrued earnings and profits in
excess of the cost of the issue of preferred stock and promptly
issued their checks to the holding companies. The holding
companies in turn issued their checks to Aero for the preferred
issue, and Aero issued a check to Sammons. Aero never paid
any money on its preferred stock, and liquidation of the
company occurred a year or two later. The Commissioner
contended that Sammons received a constructive dividend as
a result of these transactions that extinguished the indebtedness of Aero. He alleged that the amount of money Sammons
received emanated from the earnings and profits of Sammons'
insurance companies and that the money was used to save
the petitioner from a losing business investment. Sammons,
on the other hand, argued that the sale of Aero's preferred
stock represented a recapitalization and that the payment to
Sammons from Aero, as a result of this sale of stock, was
prompted by a valid business purpose, that of improving
Aero's debt to equity ratio.
The court found the Gordon, Kaplan, and Tollefson cases
relevant to its decision in this situation. The Court found
the money advanced was primarily intended to satisfy the
obligations Aero owed to the petitioner. This dividend
emanated from the earnings and profits of Sammons' four
controlled insurance companies. The court noted that the
removal of the obligation from Aero's balance sheet may have
indirectly benefited it by improving its equity position. The
court, however, did not think this sufficient to supply such a
valid business purpose as to preclude the constructive dividend
treatment. Of significance was the question as to why these
insurance companies would invest heavily in a losing operation. Also, no economic compulsion existed for the corpora-
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tions to invest in Aero, as there was no evidence to indicate
that they would be required to assume responsibility for the
indemnification agreement. In view of Aero's cash position
and the outstanding short-time obligations, it was unlikely
that any investor would have pumped such a large amount
of money into Aero, considering that this money might be
used to satisfy Aero's existing obligations. In short, the court
found that the transactions were an integrated scheme designed to reimburse the petitioner for money expended by
him on the Aero project. The Tax Court had two theories
within the constructive dividend area on which it could have
based its decision. First was the thesis that distribution from
a corporation to others for the controlling stockholder's benefit, where there is no proper business purpose, will result in a
constructve distribution to that shareholder. Secondly, where
a corporation extinguished the personal obligation of the controlling stockholder, this extinguishment will result in a constructive distribution. The court's opinion stated that the primary objective of these transactions was to relieve Sammons
of his obligations in regard to Aero. This would appear to be a
sufficient basis on which to base the holding of the court,
but the opinion goes on to say that there is no valid business
purpose attached to the transactions. This raises questions
whether the court would have found a constructive distribution if there had been a valid business purpose behind the
transactions, notwithstanding the personal obligations of the
petitioner to repay the loan. 93 This language serves to emphasize the importance the Tax Court will attach to a finding
of a valid business purpose.
Tirzah A. Cox 94 is another case in which the controlling
stockholder was charged with a constructive dividend as a
result of transfers of funds from one corporation to another
so that one corporation could pay off the loan on which the
controlling stockholder was personally liabile. The three petitioners in this case were the sole owners of C and D Construc93. In Old Dominion Plywood Corp., 25 T.C.M. 678 (1966), no con-

structive dividend treatment was applied for the entire advances from one controlled corporation to another where they were made for valid business
purposes; however, irregardless of this business purpose, a constructive dividend
was found to exist to the controlling stockholder as a result of these advances to the extent the stockholder had personally guaranteed a bank loan to
the corporation.
94. 56 T.C. No. 100 (Sept. 13, 1971).
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tion Company, Inc., a sales construction company. One of the
petitioners, Copple, was also the controlling owner of Commonwealth Company, an industrial loan and investment company. Early in 1961, two corporations, which later became
defunct, executed notes in favor of Commonwealth for a total
which was in excess of $50,000. Several months later, these
notes were sold by Commonwealth to C & D. In the latter
part of 1964, C & D and Commonwealth executed a release
which discharged the corporate and individual makers of
these notes from liability. In 1966, when C & D was financially unable to pay its $80,000 note that had been used for
purchase of the notes from Commonwealth and that had been
renewed several times and signed by Copple as an accommodation endorser, Commonwealth paid to C & D sums that
were the principle balances of the notes purchased by C & D
in 1961. This money was used by C & D primarily to make
interest and principal payments on the bank note that was
endorsed by the petitioner, Copple. The facts indicate that
the notes were initially sold by Commonwealth to C & D
because Copple, as president, feared that the Nebraska Department of Banking would order Commonwealth to charge
off some of these notes, and that this would jeopardize
Copple's solvency. The Commissioner's position was that the
payments made by Commonwealth constituted constructive
dividends to the petitioner, Copple. As C & D was without
funds or assets to pay its banknote, Copple arranged and
caused Commonwealth to transfer the funds that extinguished
Copple's liability as an endorser and alleviated the financial
plight of C & D. The petitioners contended that the sale
of notes to C & D was really a loan, as there was an understanding that Commonwealth would repurchase the notes,
and that, in fact, the payments in 1961 by Commonwealth
were pursuant to a repurchase agreement. The petitioners
alleged that they never received any part of or any benefit
from these payments.
The Tax Court found that there was no evidence to
indicate that this was a bona fide loan or to indicate that
there was any side agreement providing for repurchase of the
notes. In short, the Tax Court found that this was a purchase
of notes with no recourse. The court found that, even though
the notes were never endorsed or delivered, the notes were
validly transferred. The Tax Court found that the petitioner,
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Copple, received constructive dividends to the extent that the
amounts tranferred to C & D were used to the satisfaction
of the bank note. With the insolvent condition of C & D,
Copple, as an accommodation endorser, was only one step
away from liability. As the transfers were caused by Copple
in order to avoid liability on his endorsement, this corporate
discharge of the shareholder's personal liability was a dividend
to Copple to the extent of the corporation's earnings and
profits. In not finding any legal obligation on the part of
Commonwealth to repay C & D, the court stated that it could
not discern any valid business purpose for the transfers in
1966. This again would seem to imply that the finding of
such purpose might have precluded the application of the
constructive dividend theory irregardless of the benefit to
the shareholder in extinguishment of his liability on the note.9 5
The court found no constructive distribution to the other
petitioners and stockholders as they were not personally liable
on the note. The theory that they received a constructive
dividend by virtue of their being spared the expense of liquidation losses or money contributions was rejected by the court
since "we think it is too tenuous under these particular facts
96
and circumstances."
The Commissioner has taken the position that certain
bargain sales between brother-sister corporations will result
in a constructive dividend to the common stockholder after
section 482 of the Code is employed to allocate the bargain
element of the transaction. 97 This approach will be elaborated
on in a subsequent part of this paper, discussing application
of section 482 and one of its collateral effects, a constructive
dividend to the common stockholder.
C. Loans
In this type of transaction, the corporation that transfers
the money or property to the receiving corporation usually
receives no tax benefit in transferring the funds. That is,
95. The finding of such a valid business purpose could possibly result in
a finding that the benefit to the stockholder, in having his personal liability
extinguished, becomes only derivative and secondary to the primary business
purpose of the transaction. W. B. Rushing, 55 T.C. 888 (1969), affd 441 F.2d

593 (5th Cir. 1971).
96. 56 T.C. No. 100 at 881.
97. Rev. Rul. 69-630, 1969-2 C.B. 112.
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the lending corporation does not exclude such amounts from
its gross income or take deductions for the amounts.9 8
In Washington Institute of Technology, Inc.99 the Commissioner disallowed a bad debt deduction taken by a taxpayer
corporation on the basis of advances made by this corporation
to a corporation whose outstanding stock was owned by the
owner of the lending corporation's stock. The type of operations carried on by the taxpayer corporation were entirely
different from those of the corporation that received the
advances. The common stockholder of these two corporations
chose this method of financing this corporation to
insure retention of control of the receiving corporation. The
Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's contention that these
advances were gifts rather than loans and also rejected his
contention that these advances were contributions to capital.
The construction of a distribution to the common stockholder
of the two corporations from the transfer of the advances was
rejected:
Respondent's contention that the petitioner's advances would have

benefited only Colonel Mashbir and that these advances were in the
nature of indirect dividends disregards the doctrine of corporate entity
and is contrary to the accepted treatment of dividends. These advances
were not regarded as dividends on the petitioner's books, no declaration
of dividends was made, nor were the advances made to a stockholder.
We have no evidence before us that Colonel Mashbir regarded the
advances as dividends in any accounting of his personal finances. We
accordingly hold that advances by petitioner were loans and not
dividends. Tri-State Realty Co., 12 T.C. 192 [Dec. 16, 800); aff'd.
(C. A., 5th Cir., 1950) 180 F.2d 593 [50-1 USTC 5951].100

The Tax Court found that the common stockholder's legitimate expectations as to the eventual success of the recipient
corporation were an acceptable business purpose for making
the advances.
The Tax Court's language, above, is interesting in that it
indicates that some corporate action may be necessary to evidence a distribution in the form of dividends. This type of
98. The lending corporation could, however, derive a benefit in that the
corporation would be subject to the accumulated earnings tax under section 531
of the Code if the transfer of the funds were not made.
99. 10 T.C.M. 17 (1951).
100. 10 T.C.M. at 19.
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reasoning seems to have lost its potency. 101 The case, however,
still appears to support the proposition that if there are
acceptable business reasons for a transfer between two
there will be no constructive
commonly held corporations,
0 2
dividend treatment.

The Commissioner was more successful with his constructive dividend argument in Dcvid A. Aylsworth.10 3 Here the
petitioner owned one-half interest in Westley Shipping Company and owned, indirectly through a joint venture in
another corporation, one-half of a Panamanian corporation,
Caribbean Line. Westley advanced funds to Caribbean to
provide for a downpayment of $70,000 on purchase of a ship
with the balance of $143,000 financed by a bank. These
advances made from Westley to Caribbean were on an open
account. In deciding that these advances constituted dividend
distributions, one-half of which was taxable to the petitioner,
the Tax Court pointed out that the form of the transactions in
question did not even assume the appearance of a loan, which
the petitioner contended the transactions were. There was no
security for the "loan", no interest paid on the advances, and
no evidence of a planned fee. The court found the constructive
dividend theory applicable to the transaction in this manner:
Caribbean Line had authorized an issuance of its stock and
had accepted the subscription for the stock from two corporations in which the petitioner owned half interest, Guatemala
and West Line. There was no evidence to indicate that either
of these subscribers of the stock ever paid Caribbean any
consideration. The advance from Westley to Caribbean constituted the capitalization that was supposed to have been
supplied by Guatemala and West Line. The court stated that
the payment from Westley in effect discharged the obligation
of the two corporations to purchase capital stock of Caribbean.
Such distributions of corporate funds made to a shareholder or to a
prospective shareholder who was obligated to purchase stock in the
same corporation or in another corporation consistently have been held
to constitute dividend distributions to him.104
101. G. W. Knipe, 24 T.C.M. 668 (1965), aff'd per curiam sub nor.
Equitable Publishing Co. v. Comm'r, 356 F.2d 514 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 822 (1966).
102. Welles, supra note 46.
103. 22 T.C.M. 1111 (1963).
104. 22 T.C.M. at 1113. The court's reasoning as to how a constructive
distribution resulted to the two subscribing corporations by virtue of an
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As a result of this constructive distribution to West Line and
Guatemala, the court found a dividend distribution to the
petitioner because the constructive distribution to the corporations would "inure to the direct financial benefit of the
petitioner because of the increase in value of his equity
therein."'01 5 The court stated that, in substance, the transaction was tantamount to the petitioner's withdrawing the
money from the earnings of Westley and subsequently investing it in Caribbean as risk capital.
The court here made no mention of the advances being
made for a proper corporate business purpose. It has been
suggested that there was as much a proper corporate business
purpose in this situation as there was in other cases where
the finding of such a purpose prevented the application of the
constructive dividend theory. 0 6 In other words, there seems
to have been a significant business purpose in the Aylsworth
case since the acquisition of a ship by Caribbean would have
conceivably increased Westley's shipping business.
In Old Dominion Plywood Corp.,10 7 the stockholders of
the petitioner corporation formed another corporation, World
Woods, to supply the petitioner corporation. Old Dominion
made advances to the supplier corporation on written 90 day
notes at five percent interest. The supplier corporation later
became insolvent and was liquidated, with none of the notes
or any of the interest having been paid. After noting that any
reasonable expectation of repayment of the advances would
have necessarily depended upon the financial success of World
Woods, the Tax Court found that the advances were in the
nature of capital contributions rather than a bona fide loan.
Thus, the bad debt deductions the petitioner corporation was
seeking to take as a result of World Woods' insolvency were
extinguishment of their obligations to purchase stock from Caribbean appears
to be an around about way of constructing dividend consequences to the peti-

tioner. The approach itself does not seem applicable in this situation because
here the subscribing corporations were not shareholders or prospective shareholders of Westley, the corporation making the advance. The cases cited here
would only support the proposition that a constructive distribution results to
the stockholders of a corporation where that corporation satisfies the stock-

holder's obligation to purchase stock in that corporation or another corporation.
105. Id.
106. Jenks, mipra note 57 at 90. See W. B. Rushing, 52 T.C. 888 (1969),
aff'd 441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971).
107. 25 T.C.M. 678 (1966).
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denied. The Tax Court, however, refused to accept the respondent's contention that the entire amount of the advances
resulted in a constructive dividend to the stockholders, emphasizing the operation of World Woods as a separate corporate entity, carrying on separate business activities. The court,
however, did find a constructive dividend to the controlling
stockholder who had personally guaranteed one of World
Woods' debts that had been satisfied by part of the advances.
It was their opinion that the discharge of the personal liability
of this stockholder was a dividend to the extent of the availability of Old Dominion's earnings and profits. The earnings
and profits were sufficient to cover the amount of the note
on which the stockholder was personally obligated, and this
amount was deemed taxable to him as dividend, the court
noting Old Dominion had not paid a formal cash dividend
during the entire period in question. As the court summed
up its findings:
We cannot accept respondent's analysis of the transaction apart from

the $25,000 discharge of Cecil J. Stone, Sr.'s liability because these
advances to World Woods were not made for the personal benefit of
its shareholders but were rather capital outlays made by Old Dominion
to a corporation which it previously hoped would constitute its source
of supply. Nor can we conclude that the value of their equity in World
Woods was in any way increased on account of these advances or that
they received any tangible benefit therefrom, since they were made with
the expectation of dissolution of World Woods, and upon that dissolution, none of the shareholders received or could anticipate receiving
any distribution in liquidation.1 08

So the court found that the advances were not made for the
personal benefit of the stockholders, with the exception of
the one note that was personally guaranteed. The court further buttressed its decision by noting there was no increase
in the shareholders' equity in World Woods.
Underlying the court's decision appears to be the feeling
that this was a legitimate, business-oriented arrangement with
proper attention being given to the separate corporate entities.
The opinion also serves as an indication that a personal guarantee satisfied by advances made under the guise of "loans"
will result in constructive distribution to the guarantor-shareholder on the principle that this is an extinguishment of his
personal legal obligation.
108. Id. at 700, 701.
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In Morrison Industries,Inc. v. Commissioner,10 9 the constructive dividend issue arose out of a plan of liquidation for
an iron manufacturer. As part of this plan for liquidation,
book transfers of assets were made to some subsidiary companies. The court found constructive distributions to control-

ling stockholder Albert as a result of transactions under the
plan of liquidation.
Albert received the direct benefit of the $100,000 which was deposited
in Tradesmens Bank and which was applied to his loan. He also shared
in the $179,500 paid to or for the benefit of L. Albert & Son, a partnership in which he had a 90 percent interest. In addition, the transfers
from LCM, Inc. to corporations owned or controlled by him, constitute
constructive transfers to Albert himself. To the extent of his equitable
ownership of the corporate transferees, Albert received the benefit of
these transfers. The situation is exactly the same as if the funds bad
first been paid over to Albert and then paid over to the corporations, thereby increasing his equity in them. In an analagous situation
in Helvering v. Gordon [37-1 USTC 77 9088], 87 F.2d 663 (C.A. 8,
1937), the Court of Appeals held that where there were transfers of
income from one corporation to another, both of which were wholly
owned by individual taxpayers, the transfers were in effect taxable
distributions from the first corporation to the individual shareholders.
The court rejected the taxpayers' agurment that they were not chargeable with income since they had never presonally received the
funds ..
10

In this case, as in others, the court merely applied the prin-

ciple that a distribution from one corporation to another for
the benefit of a controlling stockholder will result in a con-

structive distribution to him. The court also noted an increase
in the shareholder's equity by virtue of these transfers.
In Christie Coal & Coke Co.,'1 ' the Commissioner con-

tended that individual shareholders were required to recognize as dividend income advances made by three related
corporations to a fourth corporation, Ruth-Elkhorn Coals,
Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Ruth). Ruth had secured a
loan through the Small Business Association to continue
its coal mining operations. In order for Ruth to receive the
loan, three related corporations were required to guarantee
the loan and submit trust deeds for the property they held.
Periodically, when Ruth was unable to meet its financial
obligations, the related corporations made advances in order
109. 21 T.C.M. 853 (1962).
110. Id. at 864.
111. 28 T.C.M. 498 (1969).
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for Ruth to meet these obligations. These advances were not
evidenced by notes nor was there interest added to the principl amount. The Tax Court first determined that the advances made by the corporations to Ruth were not deductible
as bad business debts under section 166 of the Code. The
facts indicated that the Small Business Association was furnishing money to Ruth primarily on the credit of these guarantor corporations. The court found no bona fide debtorcreditor relationship intended between the three corporations
and Ruth as a result of their guarantee on the loan and that
there was no reasonable expectation of repayment except out
of future profits that Ruth might make. The Tax Court then
rejected the Commissioner's contention that stockholders X
and Y must be charged with dividend income, the amount of
the advances made by the three corporations on behalf of
Ruth. Although the court had determined these advances were
not valid business debts and, with the exception of the advances made by one corporation, were not trade or business
expenses deductible under section 162(a), the court refused
to charge the shareholders with a constructive distribution.
In regard to the one corporation that was allowed to deduct
the advances as a business expense (its royalty income was
dependent on the success of Ruth), the court stated:
Accordingly, that a corporation makes expenditures for a valid business
reason which may also benefit one or several shareholders does not give
rise to dividend income. 112

With regard to the other two corporations which were refused
deductions for the advances either as bad business debts or
business expenses, the court did find sufficient business reasons for making these advances. The finding of this business
purpose, in the court's opinion, precluded any constructive
dividend consequence to the shareholders because such advances would not be only for the benefit of the shareholders
in funding Ruth.
However, we do believe there was a business purpose, tenuous though
it was, for making these advances. Accordingly, we find the advances
were not solely for the personal benefit of the shareholders T.M. and
O.L. This is not to say there cannot be constructive dividends where
inter-corporate advances and guarantees are paid which rebound to the
113
benefit of the majority or sole stockholders in related corporations.

112. Id. at 524.
113. Id.
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It is important to note the importance the court attaches to
the business purpose it finds for the advances made to Ruth.
The court indicated that even a finding of an insubstantial
business purpose would be sufficient to keep the benefit of
such advances from accruing only to the shareholders and
thus resulting in a constructive distribution. The business
purposes for the advances made by the three corporations
were: If Ruth's operations were successful, Ruth would be a
source of coal from which X corporation would be able to
draw in order to produce a very profitable type of coke, assuming X corporation was able to purchase expensive equipment.
Corporation Y would benefit from Ruth's successful operations as it would serve as sales agent and would derive sales
commissions. Corporation Z, the owner of the land on which
Ruth would carry out its operations, would prosper as a result
of royalty income. The promotion of the economic interest
of all three of the corporations was conditioned upon the
future success of Ruth.
W. B. Rushing1 4 illustrates how heavily a valid business
purpose for an inter-corporate transfer will weigh in a determination that there is no constructive distribution to the common shareholder. Rushing was the sole shareholder of Lubbock
Commercial Building, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as L.C.B.)
and Briercroft & Co. (hereinafter referred to as Briercroft).
Briercroft was organized by the petitioner, Rushing, to
purchase a tract of land which adjoined land owned by L.C.B.
L.C.B. was a commercial developer and planned to develop
this land as a shopping center. The tract of land purchased
by Briercroft was to be developed for residential purposes to
increase the population around the shopping center, thus enhancing the economic outlook for the center. Rushing formed
Briercroft as a separate corporation so that knowledgeable
residential developers that would be brought into the project
would not also get an interest in Rushing's commercial ventures. This was Rushing's first venture outside the commercial development area, and he thought that other developers, more knowledgeable in the residential area, would
have to be brought in for the success of Briercroft. As it
turned out, however, Rushing did not find it necessary to
bring others into the residential project. Briercroft's initial
capitalization was only $1,000. Briercroft gave a purchase
114. 52 T.C. 888 (1969), afd 441 F2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971).
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money note for over $400,000 for the land it acquired. At the
request of the sellers of the property, the note was co-signed
by L.C.B. L.C.B. made advances to Briercroft starting in
1959, the year of the purchase. There were no notes as evidence of the advances, and no interest was paid on them,
although Briercroft did repay some of the advances with
proceeds it received from the sale of residential property. In
1962, L.C.B. advanced over $60,000 to Briercroft that was
used by Briercroft for the final payment on the purchase
money note given in 1959. Neither of these corporations had
ever paid a formal dividend. L.C.B. and Briercroft merged
in 1965, the net unpaid advances from L.C.B. to Briercroft
totaling over $60,000. The principle reason for the merger
was the elimination of Briercroft's outstanding debts to
L.C.B.
The Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's argument
that the net unpaid balance on the advances was a constructive dividend to the petitioner. The Commissioner argued that
these advances were not bona fide debt and should be treated
as contributions to capital from Rushing. The court found it
unnecessary to decide whether the advances were bona fide
debt in order to find a constructive distribution to the petitioners. The test was said to be whether advances made from
one commonly held corporation to the other were primarily to
benefit Rushing. The court pointed out that Briercroft was
a separate taxable entity and that just because Rushing was
the sole shareholder of both corporations was not a sufficient
basis for concluding that Rushing constructively received the
advances of L.C.B. The court further found that whatever
personal benefit, if any, the petitioner received was derivative
and not direct in nature. The court also noted that L.C.B.
had a significant business interest in Briercroft's success since
increased residences adjacent to the shopping center would
increase business for the shopping center. As the court expressed:
We have decided that whatever personal benefit, if any, Rushing
received was derivative in nature. Since no direct benefit was received,
We cannot properly hold he received a constructive dividend.
The record further indicates that L.C.B. as a corporation had a significant interest in Briercroft's successful development of its acreage.
Briercroft's success in the development of homesites on land adjacent to
L.C.B.'s shopping center would inevitably lead to increased patronage
for the shopping center.115
115. Id. at 894.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol24/iss2/4

36

Jones: Constructive Dividends Resulting from Transactions Between Common
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS
1972]

The Tax Court mentioned two lines of cases which it termed
relevant to the constructive dividend issue under consideration. The first line deals with a corporation's purchase of
life insurance on the lives of its shareholders, the proceeds
to be used for redemption of stock of the corporation's shareholders. The I.R.S. has conceded that the premiums paid on
this insurance do not constitute constructive dividends to an
insured shareholder. 1 6. The second line of cases deals with
cases holding that when a shareholder's stock is redeemed,
the remaining shareholders do not receive a constructive
dividend since the benefits they receive are only indirect." 7
Apparently, the reason for the Tax Court's mention of these
cases, which would not seem directly applicable to the presented situation, would have been to illustrate and emphasize
the indirect and incidental benefits received by the shareholders.118
It is interesting to note that the court found it unnecessary to decide whether the advances were bona fide debts. 19
116. Rev. Rul. 59-184, 1959-1 C.B. 65.
117. Milton F. Priester, 38 T.C. 316 (1962); Robert N. Peterson, 23
T.C.M. 63 (1964); Henry C. Goss, 22 T.C.M. 1219 (1963); William A. Green,
22 T.C.M. 1241 (1963).
118. A second look, however, reveals the factual situations and the principles behind these two lines of case and suggests another possible point of
relevance. The real basis of the Commissioner's concession in the insurance
purchase cases is that the corporation is only converting one asset, cash, into
another asset, insurance. Although the court did not determine it, it would
appear that the advances made by L.C.B. to Briecroft were equity investments
in light of the thin capitalization of Briercroft and other factors. So, considering L.C.B. as becoming a stockholder in Briercroft, the reasoning of the
above line of cases has more relevance, that is, there is no dividend consequence
to the shareholder when the corporation only converts one asset, cash, into
another asset, stock.
Assuming L.C.B. became in effect a shareholder in Briercroft, the second
line of cases mentioned has relevance if the repayment of part of the advances
by Briercroft is considered a redemption of part of the stock ownership of
L.C.B. Of course, the line of cases would have even more relevance if the
merger of the two corporations could, in some way, be considered a redemption
of L.C.B.'s stock ownership. The result in both situations would be only an
indirect benefit to the common stockholder and no constructive dividend.
119. The transferor corporation in Ritshing was not claiming a bad debt
deduction which would have made such a determination necessary. Other cases
that have involved constructive dividend issue where the transferor corporation
claimed such a deduction have, of course, had to make this determination. See,
e.g., Washington Institute of Technology, Inc., 10 T.C.M. 17 (1951); Old
Dominion Plywood Corp., 25 T.C.M. 678 (1966); Christie Coal & Coke, Inc.,
28 T.C.M. 598 (1969).
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The Commissioner argued that since these advances were not
a bona fide debt they were to be treated as contributions to
capital resulting from constructive dividends to the common
shareholder. As the Tax Court displayed in Christie Coal &
Coke Co., 12 0 advances transferred that are not a bona fide
debt, and thus, not deductible as a business debt, and not an
ordinary and necessary business expense deductible under
section 162(a), do not necessarily result in a constructive
dividend to the common shareholder. So the characterization
of advances as not being a bona fide debt is not conclusive by
any means to a determination that there is a constructive
distribution to the common shareholder of the transferor and
transferee corporations. In Christie, the advances were
deemed to be equity investment due mainly to the shaky
capital structure of the transferee corporation, a situation
somewhat analagous to Rushing. The finding of a business
purpose for the advances in Christieprevented the application
of a constructive dividend treatment. In Rushing, the finaling
of a business purpose was also important in denying construcThe Tax Court used the word
tive dividend treatment.
"primarily" in Rushing' 21 and "solely" in Christie122 in referring to the nature of the benefit accrual to the shareholder
that will result in constructive dividend treatment. After
Rushing, the Commissioner was given a dual test with undefined meaning to apply in this area. In order for there to be
a constructive distribution to a common shareholder as a
result of the transaction between two commonly held corporations, the Commissioner must show that the transaction was
primarily for the benefit of the shareholder. The benefit
must also be direct rather than derivative to the shareholder.
The finding of a valid business purpose would make it difficult, if not impossible, to charge the common shareholder
with the constructive distribution.
D. Rentals
Rentals between related corporations may give rise to
application of the constructive dividend theory where two
corporations have not dealt with each other at arm's length.
An allocation by the Commissioner of income from one com120. 28 T.C.M. 498 (1969).
121. 52 T.C. 888, 893 (1969).
122. 28 T.C.M. 498, 524 (1969).
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monly held corporation to another to properly reflect an arm's
length transaction may result in a dividend consequence to the
common shareholder.
In The Challenger,Inc., 123 the Tax Court held that rents
paid by Challenger, a casino corporation, to several sister
corporations for the lease of one hundred slot machines were
excessive and unreasonable, and, therefore, nondeductible by
Challenger under section 162 (a) (3) of the Code. Although
the court refused to specifically characterize the amount of
the rentals deemed excessive, the court viewed the amounts
as either: (1) a nullity which would give rise neither to a
deduction to the lessee, nor income to the lessor; (2) a capital
contribution from the lessee to the lessor; or (3) a constructive dividend from the lessee to the common stockholders,
followed by a capital contribution from the common shareholders to the lessor. In Sparks Nugget, Inc.,12 4 a case arising
from the findings of the Tax Court in Challenger, the Tax
Court agreed with the Commissioner's contention that these
excessive amounts constituted constructive dividends to the
common stockholders, the Graves. Mr. Graves had always separated his operating and landholding interests. Sparks Nugget was operated by Challenger, and the income generated
from this casino was used to support the Graves' other interests. The casino property on which Sparks Nugget operated
was purchased by a Graves' family trust with a contribution
from the Graves and a bank loan which was to be repaid
through the rental income of Nugget Enterprises, which was a
joint venture of four of Graves' corporations. Nugget Enterprises constructed casino improvements with funds contributed by the four corporations and with the rental of the improvements by Challenger. The source of income of three of
the four corporations in Nugget Enterprises was the excessive
slot machine rental paid by Challenger. The court also held
that excessive rents paid by Challenger for parking lots resulted in a constructive dividend to Graves. These parking lots
were acquired by Sparks Development on loans that were to
be repaid through the rental of the lots to Challenger.
The court first reiterated the basic principle that a
constructive dividend can result where a transfer of funds is
123. 23 T.C.M. 2096 (1964).
124 29 T.C.M. 318 (1970), appeal pending, 9th Cir.
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made from the corporation for the stockholder's benefit. The
court then proceeded to point out the benefits that the Graves
received from these transfers:
When he transferred funds from one corporation to another, the
transfer had a good deal more significance than a transfer from one
bank account to another. Because Challenger paid excessive rentals for
the use of the slot machines to Pub, Waldorf, and Saratoga, those
corporations had available funds to be used in the construction of the
casino building that would otherwise have had to be obtained in some
other manner. For example, without such excessive rentals, it might
have been necessary for Mr. Graves to make capital contributions to
such corporations out of his income on which he paid taxes . . . In
other words, as a result of the payment of excessive rentals, the equity
in Sparks Development, Pub, Waldorf, and Saratoga was increased,
and when the Challenger stock was sold to the Ascuagas, the Graves
were left with valuable corporations, Sparks Development, Pub,
125
Waldorf, and Saratoga.

The court then rejected the petitioner's contention that the
excessive rentals amounted to a capital contribution by
Challenger to its sister corporations. The court did so on the
basis that when a non-shareholder makes a contribution to
capital, he expects to benefit materially or in some other way
from the corporation having the additional capital. 12 6 The
court noted that Challenger could expect no benefit from

making such contributions; in fact, Challenger could have
purchased the slot machines for the amounts it paid each
year in rentals. The court also rejected the petitioner's argument that Challenger had a legal obligation to pay the full
amount of the rentals as provided by state law on the basis
that the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code take precedence over local law and also rejected their argument that
there was no justification in taxing the excessive rentals since
125. Id. at 336, 337.
126. This does not appear to be a correct application of this principle.
Two cases cited by the court for this proposition should be examined more
closely. In Browa Shoe Co. v. Commissioier,339 U.S. 583 (1950), and Edwards
v. Cuba R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 628 (1925), the Supreme Court espoused the
principle that where amounts were transferred by a governmental unit or community group with the expectation of general benefit to the interests involved,
such payments would be contributions to capital. Those cases are distinguishable from a situation where one corporation transfers funds to another. Here
any benefit expected would accrue to the transferor corporation as a unit. This
type of transaction would be closer to a direct payment for services (ordinary
income) than a capital contribution. See Teleservice Co. of Wyoming Valley v.
Comm'r, 27 T.C. 722, aff'd 254 F.2d 105 (3rd Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S.
919 (1957).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol24/iss2/4

40

Jones: Constructive Dividends Resulting from Transactions Between Common
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS
1972]
they would remain in the corporate solution and eventually
be distributed to the common stockholders. In regard to the
latter contention, the court pointed out the separate legal
entity of the corporation and noted that, in the absence of
some statutory or other exception, the transfer of funds from
one corporation to another has tax consequences that are
immediate.
It is interesting to note that the benefit the court deemed
accrued to the Graves was the additional capital supplied by
the excessive rents. The court pointed out that had the excessive amounts not been available, Graves would have had to secure capital from some other source. The court felt, as an example, that it might have been necessary for Mr. Graves to
make capital contributions himself to the corporations out of
income on which he had paid taxes. Certainly this same reasoning would apply to the Rushing case 127 where Rushing
might well have had to supply additional capital for Briercroft
out of his income on which he had already paid taxes. So the
benefit received by the stockholder in Rushing is not any less
direct, nor less substantial, than the benefit received by the
Graves in Sparks Nugget, Inc.
The court in Sparks Nugget, Inc., did not mention the
presence or absence of a proper business purpose. The Commissioner had contended the excessive amounts of the rents
could not have been paid for a valid business purpose, but
this approach disregards the nature of the overall transaction.
The lease of the slot machines and property obviously served
a business purpose of Challenger which needed the machines
and location for its operations and which also provided the
leasing corporations with a source of income. Was not the
substance of this transaction the same as in Rushing, a transfer of funds from one commonly held corporation to another,
ostensibly for business reasons? The characterization of the
particular transaction should not control whether dividend
consequences will result. At first, it might appear that Challenger was avoiding corporate tax on the amounts of the rental
deductions, but the excessive rentals, included in the sister
corporations' gross income, bore the full corporate tax.

Sparks Nugget, Inc. stands as a caveat to the common
shareholder of commonly held corporations who, in light of
127. 52 T.C. 888 (1969),

affd

441 F2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971).
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Rushing, thinks he can transfer funds from one corporation
to another, on the basis of a valid business purpose, and incur
no dividend consequence. Sparks Nugget, Inc. represents a
repeal of the attitude displayed by the Tax Court in Rushing.
Of course, due to the subjective nature of the Rushing test,
that a transfer taxable to the common stockholder must be
primarily for his benefit and direct in nature, one can argue
that the test has as much validity as ever. That is, the benefits
to the Graves were the primary motive for the transactions,
and the Graves received direct benefits from them. A close
examination of Sparks Nugget, Inc., however, does not reveal
valid distinctions between the two cases.
E.

Recent Decisions of Interest

In W. C. Hudlow, Jr.,2 8 the Tax Court disallowed a bad
debt deduction that arose from a transfer of funds from
petitioners' controlled corporation, Chattanooga, to controlled
corporation, Jefferson. Noting the poor business condition of
the tranferee corporation, the court found the transfers
occurred as a result of the personal wishes of the petitioners
to supply needed capital and charged petitioners with a constructive distribution. The transfers brought no significant
corporate benefits to the transferor, Jefferson. The court
rejected the petitioners' contention that a valid business
purpose existed because the transferee corporation rented
equipment from the transferor corporation. Nor was any
business purpose found to exist because the transfers enabled
the transferee to operate successfully, thus enhancing the
transferor's reputation and increasing its business.
In J. C. Spitz, 129 a corporation owned by a decedent and
his wife sold property to another corporation whose sole
shareholder was a trust set up for the decedent's family. The
Tax Court found a constructive dividend to the decedent and
his wife to the extent of the difference between the fair market value of the property and the lower bargain price for
which it was sold. A gift was then found to have been made by
the petitioners to the trust, sole shareholder of Belle Corporation. Deciding the transaction was, in substance, a transfer
from a corporation to the individual stockholders, the court
128. 30 T.C.M. 894 (1971).
129. 30 T.C.M. 43 (1971).
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employed section 1.301 (j) of the Income Tax Regulations13" to
charge the petitioners with a distribution to the extent of the

difference between the amount paid for the property and its
fair market value.
To the extent that the bargain sale contributed to this cause, the
decedent enjoyed the excess of the value of the property over the sales
price as much as if such excess had been distributed to him, then given
to the trust, and simultaneously contributed by the trust to Belle to
provide it with needed capital. 131
32
Glenn E. Edgar1
involved a transfer of land to a

foundation. The Strain Ranch, consisting of several parcels
of land with improvements in Montana, was transferred to a

foundation. The Commissioner determined that the transfer
of the ranch resulted in constructive dividends from Strain
Brothers Corporation to Russell Strain and Harriet Strain,
life income beneficiaries of the trusts that contained the stock
of the Strain Brothers Corporation. The evidence showed that

Russell and Arthur Strain were not willing to relinquish
control over the ranch which contained their family cabins.
The ranch was a losing business venture, and the Tax Court
found that, in owning and maintaining the ranch, the foundations were merely instrumentalities, organized and operated
for the benefit of the Strains. While citing Rushing as indicative that not every distribution made without adequate consideration is a dividend, the court stated it wasn't necessary

that a distribution be paid directly to the shareholder. The
transaction was found not to be motivated by business or
humanitarian reasons but for family reasons to insure the
Strains could continue to own and enjoy the property as long

as they wished to do so. The nature of the arrangement for
the continuous control was sufficient to justify invocation of

constructive dividend treatment to the controlling stockholders.
130. Treas. Reg. §1.301(j), T.D. 6752, 1964-2 C.B. 84, provides in part:
Transfers for less than fair market value.
If property is transferred by a corporation to a shareholder
which is not a corporation for an amount less than its fair
market value in a sale or exchange, such shareholder shall be
treated as having received a distribution to which section 301
applies. In such case, the amount of the distribution shall be the
difference between the amount paid for the property and its fair
market value.
131. 30 T.C.M. at 51.
132. 56 T.C. No. 58 (July 8, 1971).
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Although all of these recent applications of the constructive dividend theory can be distinguished factually from
situations like Sparks Nugget, Inc., and Rushing, they are
indicative of the liberal trend of the Tax Court in applying
the theory.
III.

CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS-A

COLLATERAL EFFECT OF

SECTION 482 ADJUSTMENTS

Section 482 of the Code provides:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses
(whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United
States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by the same interest, the Secretary or his delegate may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income deductions, credits, or
allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses,
if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation
is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect
the income of any such organizations, trades, or businesses. 133

Where the Commissioner uses his power under this section
to allocate income or deductions between brother-sister corporations there is a possibility that one of the indirect effects
will be constructive dividend treatment. As seen, in applying
the constructive dividend principle to transfers between
brother-sister corporations, the Commissioner's contention is
that one commonly held corporation makes a distribution to
the controlling shareholder, and this distribution is followed
by a capital contribution by the shareholder to the other
corporation. Under a section 482 allocation, the Commissioner
would allocate income between controlled corporations to
adequately reflect income for tax purposes. The constructive
dividend theory would apply subsequently to such an allocation to provide a means of explaining how this income, determined to belong to one corporation for tax purposes,
actually wound up in another corporate pocket.
None of the cases reviewed previously, involving transactions between commonly held corporations that resulted in
a constructive dividend to the common stockholder, were based
on a section 482 allocation. While section 162 (a) of the Code
has been relied on as a basis for denying excessive deductions
that result in constructive dividends, 13 it is assumed where
133. INT. REv. CODE, Of 1954, §482. Section 45 of the 1939 Code is the
predecessor of this section.

134. Sparks Nugget, Inc., 29 T.C.M. 318 (1970), appeal pending 9th Cir.
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the court has not specifically relied on section 482 that the
general taxing power of section 61 is the basis for allocation
of income in other transactions that have resulted in a distri135
bution to the common shareholder.
13 6
The Tax Court raised doubt in Seminole Flavor Co.
as to whether the Commissioner, having power to allocate
income under the predecessor section of section 482, could
charge the stockholder with a constructive distribution in the
absence of corporate action. Later, the court, in ForeumJames Co., 13 7 indicated that the Commissioner had the power
to so charge the stockholders. In the Forcum-Jamescase, the
Commissioner allocated income received by a partnership to a
corporation and charged the common stockholder partners
with a preferred dividend to the extent of the allocation. The
Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's contentions, thus endorsing application of the constructive dividend theory to an

allocation under section 45 of the 1939 Code. Although this
case involved allocation from a partnership to a corporation,
the court's endorsement of the application of the constructive
dividend theory should apply equally to allocations between
commonly held corporations. Regardless, there has been little
138
use of section 482 in constructive dividend cases.
135. George W. Knipe, 24 T.C.M. 668 (1965), aff'd per curiam Sub aiom.;
Equitable Publishing Co. v. Comm'r, 356 F.2d 514 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. dended,
385 U.S. 822 (1966).
136. 4 T.C. 1215 (1945). The Commissioner's allocation here was from a
partnership to a corporation. The court said section 45 did not authorize the

Commissioner to distribute this amount as dividends to the shareholders who
were separate and distinct from the corporation. The court refused to allocate
the partnership income to the corporation using as a reason that no tax had
been evaded or avoided, since, as no dividend tax could be imposed, the corporation escaped less tax than the stockholder partners paid on the income. The
same reasoning, however, was rejected in Ballethie Motor Co. v. Comm'r, 39
T.C. 348 (1962), afJd 321 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1963).
137. 7 T.C. 1195 (1946), acquiesed in, 1948-1 C.B. 2. In Nat Harrison
Association, Inc., 42 T.C. 601 (1964), acquiesed in,1965-2 C.B. 5 and Pacific
Northwest Food Club, Inc. 23 T.C.M. 29 (1964) there was, however, no indication that the amounts allocated should be treated as a constructive dividend
to the common stockholder.
,138. This is unusual especially in light of a preference the courts have
expressed for utilization of section 482 rather than section 61 to allocate
income among controlled taxpayers. In Rubin v. Commissioter, 429 F2d 650
(2d Cir. 1970), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to the
Tax Court for a determination of the issues under section 482 where an income
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Perhaps one reason why Section 482 allocations have not
been used more by the Commissioner in constructive dividend
situations is because of Revenue Procedure 65-17.139 Although
this Revenue Procedure was designed primarily for domestic
taxpayers and controlled foreign subsidiaries to prevent dividend tax consequences from repatriation where income of the
140
domestic taxpayer has been increased by a 482 adjustment,
it would apply where both sister corporations were domestic
or where one of the corporations is domestic and its income
has been increased by a 482 allocation. 141 This Revenue Procedure will permit the domestic taxpayer corporation whose
taxable income has been increased by the section 482 allocation to (1) exclude from his income an equivalent amount
received by him as a dividend from the corporation from
which the allocation was made or (2) establish an account
receivable in an equivalent amount from the other party to
the allocation and receive payment of the account without tax
consequences. So by utilizing this Revenue Procedure, the
common shareholder would escape constructive dividend consequences when the corporation which has incurred additional
tax liability by virtue of section 482 restores the funds to the
other corporation. There are, however, limitations on the
availability of this Revenue Procedure. It does not apply
where the Commissioner determines the transaction resulting
in a section 482 allocation has as one of its principal purposes
tax avoidance. It also does not apply where the taxpayer
decides to, fight the section 482 determination in the courts
allocation was made earlier by the Tax Court between a stockholder and his
controlled corporation under section 61. This decision indicates section 482
will apply not only to allocations between controlled corporations but also
between the controlling stockholder and the corporation. Noting that section
61 is properly used in situations where transactions are freighted to a large
extent with tax motives, the court said that section 482 was preferable here,
as it commanded an analysis of the substance of the transaction and of who was
the true earner of income.
139. 1965-1 C.B. 833, as amended by Rev. Proc. 65-17, Amend. I, 1966-2
C.B. 1211.
140 Jenks, supra note 57 at 95.
141. A realization of the harshness of the combined effect of a section 482
allocation and a resulting constructive dividend, along with the desirability of
permitting a tax-free transfer of funds to conform with the allocation, have
been given by one writer as the reasons for the relief given by Revenue Procedure 65-17. Asbill, The Application of Section 482 to Domestic TaxpayersCurrent Status and Trends, 1967 So. CALIF. TAx INsT. 673, 708 (1967).
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unless he makes application for this relief prior to a determination of this issue. 142 The account receivable created by the
repayment must be set up within 90 days of the section 482
determination and discharged within the period by actual
payment of the delivery of the note. And in order for the
Procedure to apply, the taxpayer must enter into a closing
agreement with the Commissioner. It has been argued that
even those who cannot comply with these administrative
requirements under this Revenue Procedure should be entitled
to this relief, as a matter of sound law, to prevent constructive
143
dividend treatment by repayment of the allocated amount.
The common shareholder who is charged with a constructive distribution as a result of transactions between his
commonly held corporations could conceivably argue that
section 482 authorizes the Commissioner to "create income". It is submitted that the constructive dividend issue
can be distinguished from the creation of income issue under
section 482, but the line of precedent establishing the income
creation principle merits review as an area of possible relevance.
1

44

In Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner,
the stockholders of one corporation formed another corporation in order to obtain a contract in another state and allowed
the newly formed corporation to use equipment without rental
charges. The Commissioner, invoking section 482, alleged the
taxpayer had rental income in the amount of the value of the
use of the equipment. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the Commissioner's position, holding that the Commissioner did not attempt to allocate any of the income of the
using corporation to the taxpayer corporation, but simply
increased the income of the taxpayer corporation.
Section 45, supra, did not authorize the Commissioner to set up income
where none existed. The principal purpose of this section was to clearly

reflect income that did exist. 145
In Smith-Bridgeman & Co., 146 a subsidiary corporation

made an interest-free loan to its parent. The Commissioner
142.
143.
144.
145.

Rev. Proc. 65-31, 1965-2 C.B. 1024.
Jenks, supra note 57 at 96.
112 F2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940).
Id. at 510.

146. 16 T.C. 287 (1951)

acquiesced in, 1951-1 C.B. 3.
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contended that a four percent interest charge should have
been included in the gross income of the subsidiary with
respect to the loan. The Tax Court cited the Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. case for the proposition that section 45's application was predicated on the existence of income, and this
interest income could not be created by requiring the subsidiary to accrue interest.
The I.R.S. acquiesced in the above two cases, only concurring in the proposition that, where allocations and adjustments are made to income or deductions under section 482
among related business entities controlled by the same interest, corresponding adjustments must be made to the income
or deductions of the corporations from which these allocations
were made. 147 Two cases' 48 cast doubt on the proposition that
the creation of income issue was laid to rest by the comprehensive regulations of section 482 which provide for such corresponding adjustments. In Huber Homes, Inc.,149 the Tax
Court refused to allocate income to X corporation where a
number of houses had been transferred to Y subsidiary for
less than the fair market value of the houses. Y corporation
retained the houses and operated them as rental units although
its total operations resulted in a loss for the years in question.
The Commissioner alleged that X realized a profit to the
extent of the difference between the cost of the houses and
their fair market value at the time of the transfer and that
section 482 would apply to allocate the profit to X corporation.
The court held that there was no income to allocate within the
meaning of that section. The court noted that to uphold the
Commissioner's contention would result in a creation of income which section 482 definitely did not authorize. The court
specifically stated that it was not deciding whether section 482
would apply to such a situation where there was a bargain
sale and, as a consequence of use or consumption by the
transferee, income would be realized within the controlled
group. The court also specifically stated that they were not
147. Rev. Rul. 67-79, 1967-1 C.B. 117; Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(d) (2), T.D.
6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218. This regulation is a part of the comprehensive regulations
of section 482 and provides for a correlative adjustment when income is allocated from one corporation to another.
148. PPG Industries, Inc., 55 T.C. No. 93 (Dec. 31, 1971); Huber Homes,
Inc., 55 T.C. 598 (1971).
149. 55 T.C. 598 (1971).
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deciding the validity of the regulations under section 482 that
would allocate taxable income to a sister corporation, as the
regulations plainly contemplated "a situation where one or
more controlled groups sells to another at less than fair market
value and where it is expected that the control vendee would
in turn resell the property to a third party."'15 0 The Tax Court
distinguished the present case from that situation as it
found that here there was no intention to resell the houses and
that it did not appear to be in production of any net
income. Also the court stated that they did not pass upon the
validity of the regulations which apply to situations where
there is a contemplation of a resale after a bargain sale,
whether or not, in fact, such a resale ever occurs. The case,
however, does point out that a mere correlative adjustment
(here to the basis of the cost of the homes) will not prevent,
in some situations, the creation of income principle from
precluding application of section 482.
In PPC Industries, Inc.,151 the Tax Court refused to
allocate income to the parent corporation from a foreign subsidiary as a result of an interest-free loan made some years
earlier. The court stated that to charge interest on this loan
was actually an imputation of interest income on an interestfree loan that would result in a creation of income. The Tax
Court also determined in this case that there was no bargain
sale between the two subsidiaries since the transfer of net
sales proceeds in question was for a demonstrable business
reason, to avoid adverse tax and exchange control consequences in Brazil.
Huber Homes, Inc. and PPC Industries,Inc., both illustrate that the creation of income issue under section 482 is
quite viable today. Both of these cases involved bargain sale
transactions to which the court refused to apply section 482.
In 1969 I.R.S. issued a Revenue Ruling' 5 2 concerning the
applicability of section 482 to bargain sales between sister
corporations, the effect of which is a constructive dividend
to the common shareholder.
Revenue Ruling 69-630153 is an answer to a request for
advice as to the treatment of a bargain sale between X
150. Id. at 610.

151. 55 T.C. No. 93 (Dec. 31, 1971).
152. Rev. Rul. 69-630, 1969-2 C.B. 112.

153. Id.
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corporation and Y corporation. Where A, an individual, owns
all the stock of X and Y corporations, and A causes X to sell
property to Y corporation for less than an arm's length price,
a constructive dividend will result to A, subsequent to a section
482 allocation. The ruling states that the sale has as one of
its principle purposes the avoidance of federal income tax and
that the transaction results in significant understatement of
X corporation's taxable income. Applying section 482 to this
situation where there is a bargain sale between brother-sister
corporations, the amount of allocation will be treated as a
distribution to stockholder A with respect to his stock in X
and as a capital contribution by A to the other corporate
entity. As a result of the correlative adjustment provided by
section 1.482.1 (d) (2) of the Income Tax Regulations, the
basis of property in the hands of Y corporation will be increased to reflect an arm's length price. The Ruling further
states that in this type of situation, Revenue Procedure
65-171ra would not apply because the transaction had as one
of its principal purposes the avoidance of federal income tax.
So even if the qualifications and administrative requirements
of Revenue Procedure 65-17 are met, X corporation will not be
able to receive payment from Y corporation of the allocated
amount without further income tax consequences.
There is no doubt as to the I.R.S.'s position that section
482 will apply in a bargain sale between brother-sister corporations and result in a constructive dividend to the controlling shareholder. As Revenue Ruling 69-630 stated as a
matter of general application:
Section 482 of the Code applies to bargain sales transactions between

brother-sister corporations that result in significant shifting of income.
Where an allocation is made under section 482 of the Code as a result
of the bargain sale between brother-sister corporations, the amount of
allocation will be treated as a distribution to the controlling shareholder(s) with respect to the stock of the entity whose income is increased and as a capital controbution by the controlling shareholder(s)
to the other entity involved in the transaction giving rise to the section
482 allocation. 155

The lack of factual specificity as to the type of situation
covered by this Revenue Ruling and the lack of cases interpreting it have left unanswered questions as to the constructive dividend treatment in a bargain sales transaction between
154. Supra note 139.
155. Supra note 152.
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related corporations. This treatment of a bargain sale between brother-sister corporations could be a trap for the
unwary common stockholder as it could result in large tax
consequences, both at the corporate and personal income tax
level. Revenue Ruling 69-630 is an indication of the Commissioner's conviction to use aggressively the power granted
to him by statute (section 482) to police the area where a
number of corporations are controlled by the same interests
-where opportunities for tax abuse are always present.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Various principles and analyses have been used to charge
the controlling stockholder with constructive receipt of
dividends from a single closely held corporation where the
transaction was out of the ordinary course of business or was
not at arm's length. The same principles and analyses have
been applied to multi-corporate transactions to determine
whether certain transactions result in a dividend distribution
to the common stockholder. The assignment of income principle of the Horst case and corporate satisfaction of the stockholder's obligation are only two of these. Regardless of the
nature of the intercorporate transaction that may give rise
to a distribution, certain substantive consistencies can be
noted from an examination of the cases. Whenever the court
is convinced that a transaction between commonly held corporations is part of a scheme for overall tax avoidance,
constructive dividend consequences will be found. Another
significant aspect of the cases is the great importance the
courts attach to a finding of a valid business purpose as the
reason for a particular transaction. The cases indicate that
a finding of a proper business purpose, no matter how tenuous, will compensate for an otherwise one-sided, non-arm's
length transaction and preclude any constructive distribution
consequence. Only when a particular transaction is carried
out primarily for the common stockholder's benefit will he
be charged with dividend distribution. Of course, the problem is to determine when such transactions will be considered
as primarily for the benefit of the common shareholder. An
examination of the facts and circumstances of each situation,
in light of precedent in this area, is essential. Counterbalancing the theory that a transfer of funds between corporations
with common ownership is tantamount to a dividend distribu-
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tion is the policy of recognizing the corporations as legal
entities, separate and distinct.
Sparks Nugget, Inc. announces a liberal trend of the
Tax Court in applying the constructive dividend theory and a
dilution of the valid business purpose doctrine that precludes
such dividend treatment. Future litigation will determine
just how far this trend will go.
Possible constructive dividend fall out to the common
shareholder, as a result of a section 482 allocation, is a distinct
reality that must be considered. Moreover, in view of the
I.R.S.'s pronouncement in Revenue Ruling 69-630, it is clear
when section 482 is employed in certain bargain sales situations, the controlling stockholder will be charged with a constructive distribution without an opportunity to resort to
administrative relief under Revenue Procedure 65-17 that
might be otherwise available.
A review of this area justifies the conclusion that, in
view of the Commissioner's assault in asserting constructive
dividends in numerous multiple entity cases and the court's
acceptance of his contentions, a controlling stockholder of
commonly held corporations would be well advised to consider
the dividend consequences of any transfer of funds between
the corporations. The stakes can be high in this multi-corpoxate shell game.
RICHARD A. JONES, JR.
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